Pre-flight check for legal content BEFORE it is sent to an external, cloud-based AI tool (browser chatbot, office-suite assistant, any API outside the firm's control)...
A prompt pasted into someone else's chatbot is a disclosure. Not "tool usage" - a disclosure.
No lawyer would fax a case file to a newspaper to get a second opinion on the drafting style. Yet the same lawyer will paste half a statement of claim into a free chatbot "just to polish the wording". The two acts differ less than it seems: the content leaves the firm and lands with a third party, on terms nobody read, with retention nobody controls, possibly on servers outside the EEA.
This skill does one thing: it holds the hand above the Enter key for the length of one check. It does not ban cloud AI - firms use it and will keep using it. It forces a conscious decision instead: what exactly leaves, to whom, on what terms, and what happens if it ever surfaces.
The verdict is banded, not binary. Most prompts are neither clean nor forbidden - they are redactable. That is why the middle band (CAUTION) ends with a redacted draft rather than a lecture.
The frame here is European: legal professional privilege as shaped by the Court of Justice of the EU, national professional secrecy regimes, GDPR, and the Trade Secrets Directive. US attorney-client privilege appears only as a comparative footnote, not as the operating framework.
Use it:
What it does NOT do (explicit negative scope):
gdpr-dpia-en; the preflight checks a single piece of content,
not a process,Quote an article number only when it is certain. Otherwise describe the duty in
words and mark it [TO VERIFY]. Never invent a citation.
[TO VERIFY] per country.[TO VERIFY].Score each factor separately: CLEAN / CAUTION / CRITICAL.
(a) Client identifiability. Direct (company name, registration number, personal names, case reference) AND mosaic: the combination of industry, city, dispute amount and event date can point to one client even though no single element does. Mosaic test: would a local journalist with a search engine work out who this is?
(b) Facts under professional secrecy. Everything the lawyer learned in connection with providing legal assistance - including facts that look neutral (the mere fact that a client seeks advice on a given matter is itself covered).
(c) Litigation strategy / work-product. Planned pleas, assessment of the weaknesses of one's own position, negotiation tactics, internal notes on witness credibility. This is the most dangerous category - disclosure harms even after full pseudonymisation, because the value sits in the reasoning itself, not in the identity of the parties.
(d) Third-party personal data. Witnesses, the opposing party, family members, the client's employees. They chose no law firm and accepted no terms - the lawful basis for processing their data in a cloud AI tool is usually the weakest link.
(e) Where the prompt goes. The AI provider's terms: is prompt content used for model training, what is the retention period (and can it be switched off), where are the servers, is there a transfer outside the EEA and on what basis, is there a data processing agreement (Art. 28 GDPR), free tier or business tier (the terms can differ radically). If the user does not know - assume the worst variant and say so explicitly.
Break the prompt into elements: who is named (entities, persons), which facts, which figures and dates, which document fragments, whether it contains the lawyer's own reasoning (assessment, tactics), and where the user wants to send it (tool name and tier). No inventory, no assessment - "I roughly know what is in there" does not count.
Each factor (a)-(e) gets CLEAN / CAUTION / CRITICAL plus one sentence of justification quoting the fragment that drives the score.
The aggregation rule is mechanical:
For CAUTION and STOP: two-three sentences on what concretely happens if the content surfaces - towards the client (lost trust, harm to the matter), towards the lawyer (disciplinary exposure, liability), towards third parties (GDPR claims). No scaremongering - a realistic scenario.
Prepare a redacted version of the prompt: pseudonymise entities and values with placeholders [CLIENT], [COUNTERPARTY], [PERSON-1], [AMOUNT], [DATE], [PLACE], [CASE-REF]; delete fragments unnecessary for the prompt's purpose (the cheapest redaction is deletion); re-run the mosaic test AFTER redaction - does the combination of what remains still point to the client. For STOP, produce no draft - a redacted litigation strategy is still a litigation strategy.
Always show a way forward, not only a prohibition:
Present the result and stop. See the "Human gate" section.
## Privilege preflight - <working name of the prompt>
Prompt purpose: <what the user wants to achieve by sending it>
Target tool: <name + tier (free/business) or "unknown - worst case assumed">
| Factor | Score | Justification (content fragment) |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------|
| (a) Client identifiability | CAUTION | company name + city + industry |
| (b) Facts under secrecy | CAUTION | course of negotiations described |
| (c) Strategy / work-product | CLEAN | no tactical assessment in the text |
| (d) Third-party personal data | CAUTION | witness named in full |
| (e) Provider terms | CRITICAL | free tier, training on user content |
VERDICT: STOP
Disclosure impact: <2-3 sentences, realistic scenario>
Recommendation: <on STOP - alternatives; on CAUTION - draft below; on SAFE - clear to send>
--- REDACTED VERSION (draft, CAUTION only - requires human approval) ---
<content with placeholders [CLIENT], [AMOUNT], [DATE]...>
--- END OF DRAFT ---
Mosaic check after redaction: <passed / failed + why>
The decision belongs to a human. This skill has sent nothing.
The skill's output is a draft, not a decision. Nothing gets sent until an authorised human has read the verdict, the factor table and - on CAUTION - the entire redacted draft, line by line. The human approves, corrects or rejects; sending is always the human's own act, performed outside this skill.
The governance boundary is hard: the skill prepares, the human executes. This covers redaction too - an automatically inserted placeholder can miss the context (e.g. [AMOUNT] inside a contract quote where the amount is the very subject of the question). A draft nobody read is worthless and must never be treated as "already anonymised".
The SAFE band passes through the gate as well: the human sees the factor table and presses Enter personally. SAFE shortens the deliberation, it does not remove the responsibility.
matematic-prompt-defense-pl - hardening of a system prompt against attacks;
the preflight watches what leaves the firm, prompt-defense watches what can
attack the firm's own AI. Two sides of the same hygiene.gdpr-dpia-en - data protection impact assessment for DEPLOYING an AI tool as
a process; the preflight is a per-item check. If preflights for the same tool
keep ending in CAUTION/STOP, that is the signal for a DPIA and a systemic
decision, not for yet another round of redactions.doc-intel-contract-pl - when the content comes from a document: extraction
with confidence gating and redaction candidates (PII with checksums) gives the
preflight better input than raw copy-paste.legal-request-router-pl - routing of a legal task; the preflight can be its
first stop before the router even picks a verification path.These rules apply to every skill in this plugin, including where the skill itself is silent. They are copied into each skill, so they hold whether you install the whole plugin or a single skill.
These skills run regulatory triage for organisations deploying or building AI: EU AI Act classification and role mapping, NIS2 scope and obligations triage, and a privilege pre-flight check before legal content is sent to an external AI surface. Each ends in a draft for decision, not a finished act.
Regulatory triage for AI and cyber (AI Act, NIS2) plus prompt-level privilege hygiene. It does not verify citations or fetch sources of law - use verification-foundation and eu-law-sources for that. GDPR operations (DPIA, breach, DSAR) live in data-protection; the AI Act triage pairs with gdpr-dpia-en when a system processes personal data.